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THE USE OF HISTORICAL DATA IN ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH: THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN SUGAR
REFINING COMPANY
Abstract: In 1908, the American Sugar Refining Company
(ASR) reversed its long-held policy of secrecy as to its
financial condition and performance. Prior work, applying
contemporary capital market methods to ASR security price
data of that period, has suggested a value to ASR
shareholders of this policy reversal. This paper examines
the historical record of that time and presents additional
evidence on this matter, particularly in terms of identifying
potentially confounding events occurring during the period
under study. The results of this analysis suggest a difficulty
in attributing observed abnormal returns to ASR's secrecy
policy reversal on the basis of the results obtained from
applying capital markets methods. This analysis is useful
for scholars interested in applying modern capital market
methods to historical data. It highlights the significance of
the possible effects of contemporaneous historical events,
focuses attention on the importance of a deep understanding
of the historical period studied, and suggests a value in
combining historical and empirical-markets methods to
gain a richer understanding of the events and conditions in
the time period under study.
The application of modern capital markets methods to explore
accounting issues in historical time periods has attracted increased
interest in recent years. One such study, Porter et al, (1995) (hereafter
PSW) examine the effects of American Sugar Refining's (ASR's) 1908
reversal of afinancialsecrecy policy to determine the value of voluntary
disclosure per se and voluntary disclosure policy. They find in part,
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using traditional capital markets methods and an event window around
the time of the secrecy policy reversal, positive abnormal returns for
ASR stock. Thesefindingslead them to conclude that the secrecy policy
reversal had measurable value to ASR stockholders. Narrowly, the
purpose of this paper is to assess these findings and to consider whether
other chronologically proximate events and conditions could plausibly
have affected the valuation of American Sugar securities. Broadly, this
paper seeks to address the use of data in capital markets studies of
historical time periods, and the interpretation of results derived in such
studies. Not addressed in this paper are underlying issues related to
institutional arrangements, acceptable trading practices, and other
matters pertinent to the issue of market efficiency during this historical
period. We are not challenging the assumption that ASR security pricing
was efficient with respect to publicly available information. Readers
interested in studying issues of this period related to market efficiency
are referred to Previts and Bricker (1994).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review
the PSW study and summarize the historical events amidst which it is
set, these being the illness and death of H.O. Havemeyer, the long time
President of ASR, the succession of a new president, and the company's
annual meeting at which time ASR formally announced the reversal of
its long-held financial secrecy policy. Several research issues pertinent
to the PSW study, primarily related to the existence of other possibly
significant historical events during the period covered by PSW, are
identified. We then provide a contextual, historical analysis of
contemporaneous events and conditions of the period and use this as a
basis for evaluating the PSW study of ASR. Particular attention is
focused on events reported in the financial press that may have affected
ASR security pricing, dates on which press reports related to ASR's
financial secrecy policy are published, and the period of uncertainty
surrounding the succession to the ASR Presidency that occurred
following Havemeyer's death. Next, using the PSW data and methods,
tests extending the original PSW analysis are conducted based on the
results of our historical analysis. Following a presentation and discussion
of these results, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the
opportunities and difficulties of applying capital markets methods to data
from historical time periods.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/2
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BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH ISSUES
The PSW study follows a line of research that has applied
contemporary capital markets methods and models to data from
historical time periods. Prior work has included Chow (1983) and
Sivakumar and Waymire (1993 and 1994). The focus of these studies on
historical time periods makes them interesting and appealing. Chow's
work, however, has been specifically criticized by Merino et al (1987),
and Previts and Bricker (1994) argue generally that such studies must
fully consider historical contextual issues that are essential in both the
design of such studies and the interpretation of results.
The PSW study finds that ASR shareholders earned abnormal
returns as a result of the 1908 reversal of Henry 0. Havemeyer's longheldfinancialsecrecy policy. As summarized in PSW, Havemeyer, who
opposed disclosure of any ASR information, died suddenly on December
4, 1907 after becoming ill on November 28, 1907. Havemeyer's
successor, W. B. Thomas, "announced the company's intent to reverse
its long-standing secrecy policy by making periodic reports" (PSW,
1995, p. 129) at the company's annual meeting on January 8, 1908. On
March 23, 1908, ASR made its first annual report available to
shareholders. PSW examine cumulative abnormal returns to ASR
shareholders for both the secrecy policy reversal on January 8, and the
publication of the annual report on March 23 (and each preceding day).
They find a positive wealth effect which is statistically significant for
three sets of dates: January 8th, January 8th and March 23rd combined,
and January 7th and 8th and March 21 st and 23rd combined. On the basis
of the abnormal returns of these dates, PSW conclude the existence of a
value to voluntary reporting - for the first event as related to voluntary
reporting policy, and for the second event as related to voluntary
reporting per se, for ASR shareholders. We do not address the value of
voluntary reporting per se in the remainder of this paper, but rather on
the issue of a value to a policy of voluntary reporting, as studied by
PSW in their assessment of the effects of ASR's secrecy policy reversal.
The PSW study measures ASR returns from September 30th, 1907
to May 29th, 1908. PSW use a dummy variable is used to measure the
difference in returns during the event window(s) in comparison to returns
outside the event window. The event date for the secrecy policy reversal
(disclosure precommitment date) is defined as January 8, the date on
which the company's policy reversal was officially announced during its
annual meeting. The resulting model is significant (p = .023) and they
find a significant cumulative positive abnormal return of 2.35 percent.
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Several issues not fully addressed in PSW may bear on their results
and the interpretation thereof, as listed below.
•

The date used by PSW to isolate the financial secrecy policy
reversal effect (January 8th) is the date of ASR's annual meeting. It
is conceivable that other potentially significant disclosures may have
occurred on that date. Such disclosures would raise issues about
distinguishing ASR's secrecy policy reversal from its voluntary
reporting, per se, (or other economic effects) as causes of ASR
security price changes.

•

January 8th is the sole date used by PSW in assessing the
(separable) effect of ASR's secrecy policy reversal. If, however,
there are other dates on which ASR's secrecy policy was addressed
in financial press reports prior to January 8, then such dates should
also be added to any empirical analysis addressing the effect of the
secrecy policy reversal on ASR securities.

•

The period of the illness and death of Havemeyer is included by
PSW as a part of the period for estimating ASR normal returns.
However, any systematic ASR pricing reaction to Havemeyer's
passing may influence the PSW results.

Several research questions arise from these issues. First, is it
reasonable to attribute any abnormal ASR price effect on January 8th to
a change in the company's financial secrecy policy, or do other
disclosures confound such an interpretation? Second, were there other
dates in addition to January 8th (the date used by PSW) which are
plausible event dates for assessing the effect of the secrecy policy
reversal? Third, was there an ASR security price reaction to the
succession uncertainty that may have occurred with and following the
illness and death of Havemeyer? If so, would this effect influence PSW's
findings?
ANALYSIS
Our analysis consists of two parts. First, we study the events and
conditions roughly contemporaneous with January 8th to address the
three questions posed above. Then, using the same data and methods as
PSW, we conduct additional empirical testing based on the results of our
first phase of analysis.
Research question one explores the attribution of the observed ASR
abnormal return effect to the announcement of the secrecy policy
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reversal, and whether other information released on this date could have
had information content and have affected ASR security pricing. An
analysis of the financial press articles of the period in the Financial
Chronicle, the Wall Street Journal, and the financial section of the New
York Times raises issues potentially bearing on this matter. Significantly,
January 8th was not just a date on which ASR announced the reversal of
the secrecy policy, but (as noted in PSW) was the date of ASR's annual
meeting. For instance, it was on this day that the company made its
initial report of its annual operations to shareholders, and also discussed
other economic and political developments prospectively affecting ASR.
It appears (and widely believed), for example, that sugar crop and tariff
announcements were important factors in ASR security pricing. As
reported on the following day by the Wall Street Journal, management
discussed several topics during the annual meeting: that the past year had
been the best that the company had experienced, that the policy of the
company with new management would be less antagonistic and less
secret, that various lawsuits would be adjudicated, that sugar crops were
smaller and prices higher, that labor trouble in Cuba implied a smaller
crop, and that government statements on tariffs were favorable to ASR.
All of these reported disclosures, to the extent unanticipated, could be
expected to increase ASR security prices. Even with the presence of
some level of anticipation, the elimination of uncertainty accompanying
the official company announcement would also tend to increase ASR
security prices and returns. These several potentially significant
information disclosures confound interpretations of stock price reactions
for the day and certainly do not lend themselves to an unambiguous
attribution of the day's abnormal price effect to any single cause.
Research question two addresses the existence of additional dates
which may have lead to a market anticipation of a reversal of ASR's
secrecy policy. We searched financial press reports of the period from
the date of Havemeyer's illness to the date of the official announcement
of the policy reversal to identify all days on which the secrecy policy
reversal of ASR was discussed, implied, or anticipated. We identified the
following four dates:
•

In The Wall Street Journal of Thursday, December 5th 1907 in an
article following H. O. Havemeyer's death, it was asserted that
"(Havemeyer's) policy was not that of publicity, so that he belonged
to a passing rather than to a new era of corporate finance." This
assertion implies that Havemeyer's secrecy policy would not survive
him.
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•

In the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, December 10th, 1907, the
following article appeared: "American Sugar Refining Co.:
Havemeyer's Death Likely to Result in Abandonment of Secrecy
Policy".

•

In the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, January 7th, 1908 in an
article preceding the next day's annual meeting, it was written that
". . . it is supposed that the policy of the company will change, the
keynote of the new administration being less antagonistic and less
secret".

•

In the Wall Street Journal of Wednesday, January 8th, in an article
published prior to that day's annual meeting, it was written that
"Friends of (ASR) . . . admit that more publicity in regard to the
company's affairs would be better policy... President Thomas has
given his word to this effect... the first step in this direction is
expected at the annual meeting tomorrow, when President Thomas
may in his review of the year disclose more information than has
been given out heretofore." January 8th was also, of course, the date
of the actual annual meeting at which the financial secrecy policy
reversal was officially announced later that day (See January 9 New York Times).

Although PSW use event dates of January 7th and 8th as well as
those of March 21st and March 23rd, only January 8th is tested
individually for a secrecy policy reversal effect. PSW's remaining tests
address the joint hypothesis of a price response as a function of both
voluntary reporting and the secrecy policy reversal. If PSW's hypothesis
about the value of a voluntary reporting and publicity policy, per se, is
correct, then we would expect to see positive security price effects on
each of the event days, with the effect on the 8th being limited to the
elimination of whatever uncertainty remained regarding reversal of the
secrecy policy.
As related to the third research question posed, any analysis of this
period or interpretation of results requires consideration of any possible
effect on ASR security prices of the illness and death of Henry
Havemeyer. Particularly, as described subsequently, if Havemeyer's
death resulted in a period of uncertainty related to management
succession, and if that period was included in an estimation window for
calculating normal ASR returns, then the stationarity assumption of
PSW's beta estimate would be violated, with the result that in the
estimation of ASR normal returns would be mathematically biased.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/2
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Specifically, the statistical analysis computing returns in the immediately
subsequent period would be biased in favor of finding abnormal returns.
Ha.vemeyer's passing was clearly regarded as a significant event in
the eyes of ASR, the financial markets, and its shareholders, according
tofinancialpress accounts of the time. These accounts reflect the belief,
for example, of an association between Havemeyer's illness and death
and an ASR's stock price decline that occurred. On December 4th, the
Wall Street Journal's daily column "Features of the Market" column
noted "American Sugar was naturally depressed on the serious illness of
H.O. Havemeyer". On December 6th, the same column noted that "(t)he
first transaction in (ASR) was one point below the closing sale of the
previous day on President Havemeyer's death. It is admitted that the loss
to the company is a very serious one . . ."On December 12, as ASR's
common stock price neared its nadir, "Features of the Market" stated that
"(ASR) selling . . . comes through conservative commission houses . ..
It is naturally based upon the very tangible loss the company . . . has
sustained in H.O. Havemeyer's death and represents investment
holdings." On December 16, the column reported that "Boston has been
selling the stock since H. 0. Havemeyer's death. This is a natural result,
as investors there had great faith in the late president." An article in
December 17th's Wall Street Journal stated " . . . One reason advanced
for the marked decline in the stock is the loss of H.O. Havemeyer, which,
if be true, is indeed a tribute to his ability as the real genius of the
American Sugar Refining Company." On January 4th, well into ASR's
price rebound, and following a day on which the stock closed up over 6
1/2 points to 107, the "Features of the Market" column noted, "One
reason for the exceptional strength in Sugar is the real scarcity of the
stock... It was always a dangerous short sale, and was oversold when
H. O. Havemeyer died".
As the matter of succession was not settled at ASR at the time of
Havemeyer's illness and death, it is plausible to believe that his passing
initiated a significant process of increasing uncertainty as to management
succession and ASR prospects. PSW, in contrast, address the possible
impact of Havemeyer's death from a different perspective:
" . . . our results may be confounded by Havemeyer's sudden
death. For example, investors may have expected Havemeyer's
death to lead to the adoption of a disclosure policy, and
impounded any wealth effects at that time. Accordingly, we
investigated ASR stock returns at the time of Havemeyer's
death. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that
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favorable effects of the subsequent policy reversal were
capitalized when Havemeyer died; the market adjusted return
on the date of his death was -2.26 percent. No large price
movements were observed in adjacent days." (PSW, 1995, p.
136-137)
PSW, then, focus on the possibility that the death of Havemeyer
itself may have signaled a reversal of the secrecy policy, and so test for
a positive abnormal return effect. But they do not examine an alternative
possibility that an uncertainty-increasing process began at the date of
Havemeyer's illness regarding management succession and ASR
prospects and concluded at ASR's announcement of his successor,
resulting in a negative abnormal return effect for the period.
Chronologically, this succession-uncertainty process occurred
several weeks prior to ASR's annual meeting and the formally
announced reversal of the secrecy policy. Havemeyer's sickness began
November 29th (he died December 4), and W.B. Thomas was announced
as his successor on December 20th. A visual inspection of Figure 1,
which is reproduced from PSW, shows that ASR returns turned negative
about the time of Havemeyer's sickness and death, and remained
negative until the December 20th announcement regarding W.B.
Thomas.
FIGURE 1
ASR Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns
(Reprinted from Porter et al [1995])
Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns on ASR Common Stock from Late
November 1907 to Late March 1908

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/2
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decline in ASR returns during this period, it does provide prima facia
evidence of a decline in ASR security prices as well as an analyst and
press belief that this was so. Such an effect, as described above, would
bias an analysis of abnormal returns on January 8th in favor of a
rejection of the null hypothesis. Specific empirical tests on this are
described later in the paper.
The empirical portion of our analysis began with a replication of a
portion of PSW in order to establish comparability with its data and
methods. Using the same parameters and process for selecting a data set,
and duplicating the general model employed by PSW, we tested for a
price effect on January 8th, the date of the financial secrecy policy
reversal. Following PSW we employed a dummy variable for the date of
January 8th as the secrecy policy reversal event date, and used the
railroad index to proxy for the market. The results, shown in Table 1,
Panel A, compare the PSW results (Item 1) with our replication (Item 2);
The results are generally consistent, including an event-variable
coefficient (probability) of .0235 (.023) and .0237 (.026) respectively.
Therefore, we are comfortable that our data and method fairly closely
approximates those of PSW.
Table 1
Estimation Results for Event Parameter Models
Panel A
Single Event Models
Description (event dates)
(1) Porter Results

ά

ά(t)

β

β(t)

δ

δ(t)

δ(p)

r2

CAR%

.008 1.11.833 12.18.0235 2.29.023.436

2.35

(1/8/08)
(2) Replication Results

.001 .91.798 11.31 .0237 2.24.026.387 2.37

(1/8/08)
(3) Four Event Dates Results .001 1.21 .796 11.16 -.0061 -1.14 .250 .386 -2.45
(12/5/07,12/10/07,
1/7/08,1/8/08)
(4) Uncertainty Results
(12/3/07 through 1/19/08)

.001 1.72 .791 11.23 -.0070 -2.47 .014 .400 -10.47

(5) Two Event Dates Results .001 1.01 .795 11.12 .0031 .40.687.382

.61

(1/7/08,1/8/08)
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ά(t) β β(t)
δ1 δ1(t) δ1(p) δ1CAR% δ2 δ2(t) δ2(p) δ2CAR% r2
.001 1.67 .791 11.21 -.007 -2.458 .015 11.20 .0025 .387 .131 .50
.398
ά

where δ1 represents the "succession uncertainty" event of 12/3/07 to
1/19/08
andδ2represents the "secrecy policy reversal" event of 1/7 and 1/8/08.
Next, to empirically address research question 2, we tested for a
policy reversal effect using the four dates identified above (days on
which reversal of the secrecy policy was discussed in press articles).
Although PSW use event dates of January 7th and 8th as well as those
of March 21st and March 23rd, only January 8th is tested individually
for a secrecy policy reversal effect. PSW's remaining tests address the
joint hypothesis of a price response as a function of both voluntary
reporting and the secrecy policy reversal. Using the method described
above, we tested for a secrecy policy reversal effect using December 5th,
December 10th, January 7th, and January 8th. The results are given in
Table 1, Panel A, Item 3 which shows no significant effect on the
secrecy reversal variable for the dates with secrecy policy reversal
references. Notably, the sign of the coefficient on the event variable is
negative (-.0061).
Using the data set and general model described above, we tested the
hypothesis derived from research question 3: that an uncertaintyincreasing process began with the illness of Havemeyer and ended with
the announced selection of Thomas. We employed a dummy variable for
the dates of December 3rd, when Havemeyer's illness was first reported
in the New York Times, through December 19th, the day before the Wall
Street Journal announced W.B. Thomas's upcoming election as ASR
president. We observe in Table 1, Panel A, Item 4 a highly significant
effect (p. = .014) on the event days in the direction consistent with an
uncertainty-increasing process (that is, negative). Using PSW's method
of calculating the size of the abnormal return as the product of the
dummy coefficient (-.0070) and the number of days in the event period
(15), we find a cumulative abnormal return of -10.50%. Overall, this
evidence is consistent with a picture of investors who became
increasingly distressed by the uncertainty of management succession
until the experienced W. B. Thomas was identified as H. O.
Havemeyer's successor. As a further test of investor uncertainty during
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/2
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this period, we compared an ASR market model using the period of
September 30th 1907 through January 19th, 1908, with a model using
a period of the same length immediately after. As shown in Table 2,
ASR's beta increases from .786 to .963 in the two models, and their
difference is marginally significant at alpha = . 10.
Irrespective of the interpretation of the above results, they
demonstrate that any model used for estimating ASR normal returns that
includes the period from December 3 rd through December 19th cannot
assume beta stationarity; the inclusion of the period effectively
incorporates a bias for rejecting a null hypothesis for any event date(s)
proximately subsequent to that period. This occurs because the inclusion
of the uncertainty-increasing period mathematically reduces the slope
(coefficient) on the systematic (market) return. Given the evidence and
findings described above, the PSW findings are reinforced by the
occurrence of an event window that merely happened to fall following a
period of significant negative abnormal returns included in the estimation
period. Indeed, any event identified during the period immediately
following the resolution of the succession issue would be biased towards
the finding of positive abnormal returns for ASR investors. A second
implication, as mentioned earlier, is that any policy reversal tests using
event dates falling during this period could be confounded by the
succession uncertainty effect. For this reason, our earlier results, which
included two secrecy policy reversal event dates falling during this
apparent succession uncertainty period, may be biased against finding a
positive ASR abnormal return associated with a reversal in its secrecy
policy1.

1

It is hard to have much confidence in these results. As described in the
next section, tests reveal a negative security market response to the succession
uncertainty accompanying the illness and death of Havemeyer, which
potentially confounds any analysis including event days in the period from
November 29th to December 20th. The policy reversal test described above
includes the event dates of December 5th and December 10th. Further
complicating any interpretation of our results, news articles on ASR on the
two remaining days, December 7th and 8th, refer to both the secrecy policy
reversal and other matters of potential importance. We have previously
described the topics covered in the press on January 8th. The day before
ASR's annual meeting (January 7th) The Wall Street Journal not only
discussed the anticipated secrecy policy reversal, but based on favorable news
about the sugar market and the favorable estimates made regarding ASR's
financial
results,1997
the article declares ASR's "past fiscal year... was one of the
Published by eGrove,
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We, therefore, respecified our model to include a separate dummy
variable for the event dates falling in the succession uncertainty period
and used only the event dates of January 7th and January 8th (we
removed December 5th and 10th). The results, shown in Table 1, Panel
B again suggest no effect of the secrecy policy reversal. The coefficient
on the policy reversal variable is positive (.0025) but not significant,
with an implied CAR of .50%. The succession uncertainty variable is
negative (-.007) and significant (p = .015), with an implied CAR of 11.2%. While this may appear odd, our investigation suggests that it
may reflect (as reported by the financial press) C.A. Spreckels'
published attack on ASR which appeared on that day.
To test the sensitivity of the results to the separation of the
succession uncertainty dates as a second event, we reran the analysis
including the succession uncertainty dates as estimation dates (that is,
along with all the other dates in the estimation period), continuing with
January 7th and 8th as event dates. Table 1, Panel A, Item 5 shows a
positive coefficient on the policy reversal variable that, while slightly
larger than the result in Panel B, is still statistically insignificant.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, the results do not necessarily rule out that the positive
wealth effect observed on January 8th for ASR shareholders resulted
from ASR's reversal of its secrecy policy. However, our analysis of the
events and context surrounding January 8th suggests the following. First,
there were several disclosures with potential import to investors. While
PSW are correct in their finding of an empirically measurable abnormal
return on January 8th, it is difficult to know how much of this effect can
be attributed to the official policy reversal announcement versus ASR's
report of a good year, Cuban crop shortages, favorable government tariff
policies, the methodological artifact stemming from the succession
uncertainty following Havemeyer's death (nonstationary beta), or the
secrecy policy reversal. There are, thus, several possible factors which
may have contributed to the ASR abnormal return effect found by PSW
on January 8th.
Second, the financial press anticipated the reversal of the secrecy
policy other dates. When included in an analysis, no positive abnormal

best that the company has experienced..."
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/2
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returns for those dates are found. However, these results may be suspect
because the analysis includes event dates during the negative-return
period that accompany the apparent succession uncertainty at the time
of H.O. Havemeyer's death. Nevertheless, when controlling for the
succession uncertainty dates and reducing the event dates to January 7th
and 8th, we found no secrecy policy reversal event effect, even when
including the succession uncertainty dates in the "normal return"
estimation period. Yet even this result cannot be relied upon, as financial
press articles attribute ASR stock price weakness on the 7th to C.A.
Spreckels published criticism of ASR on that date.
Finally, as mentioned just above, the positive abnormal return of
January 8th is, in part, a statistical artifact resulting from the succession
uncertainty following Havemeyer's death. During this period of
succession uncertainty ASR returns were below market returns. The
nonstationary beta confounds the interpretation of any event dates
occurring during the succession uncertainty period (including some of the
secrecy reversal policy dates), and mathematically biases any statistical
analysis using this period in the window for estimating normal returns in
favor of finding a positive abnormal return for immediately subsequent
dates.
We conclude that it is not possible with the present data and capital
markets methods to empirically and statistically attribute ASR's positive
abnormal returns to its reversal in its secrecy policy. Our objective,
however, is not to disprove that ASR's secrecy policy reversal resulted
in a stock price change. Rather, our point is to emphasize the importance
in considering all the contextual factors salient to research focusing on
historical time periods. This is particularly important when applying
contemporary markets methods to data from such periods. Aside from
issues of market efficiency during this period (Previts and Bricker,
1994), the nature of historical data may frequently place some
limitations on the drawing of conclusions, particularly when the data are
scarce and the historical context of the events renders data interpretation
ambiguous. Correspondingly, it may be in such instances that historical
analysis can be a useful and tool for more fully investigating,
interpreting, and augmenting the results of empirical work. In this way,
modern capital markets method and historical analysis may prove to be
valuable complements in studying historical time periods.
It is helpful and desirable for accounting scholars to carefully
construct research that applies contemporary methods to historical
accounting data as a backdrop for considering present-day issues.
Published by eGrove, 1997
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Empirical researchers are to be commended for conducting pioneering
work in this area. Future research of this sort should continue to develop
full and careful approaches to combining historical analysis with modern
capital market methods, so that adequate consideration of the
fundamental contextual factors can be used in the design of such
research and in the interpretability of results.
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Appendix A
American Sugar Refining Prices
November 1, 1907 through January 31, 1908

Date
11/1
11/2
11/4
11/6
11/7
11/8
11/9
11/11
11/12
11/13
11/14
11/15
11/16
11/18
11/19
11/20
11/21
11/22
11/23
11/25
11/26
11/27
11/29
11/30
12/2
12/3
12/4
12/5
12/6
12/7
12/9
12/10
12/11
12/12
12/13
12/14
12/16
12/17
12/18
12/19
12/20

American
Sugar
100.625
100.625
104.000
105.000
103.625
103.625
103.625
105.875
104.500
104.250
101.875
100.500
101.250
103.000
101.125
101.750
101.000
101.500
103.000
103.000
104.000
103.000
103.750
106.000
107.750
106.000
106.500
107.250
107.750
107.000
105.000
102.000
98.375
98.375
94.125
94.125
95.625
95.750
96.250
98.000
100.000

Dow Jones
Railroad
index

Notes

84.360
84.140
85.050
85.720
84.270
85.090
85.070
85.910
85.410
84.800
84.150
82.500
82.970
84.600
82.930
82.380
81.410
81.490
83.400
81.720
83.510
84.090
85.800 Havemeyer is ill 11/28
87.130
88.280
87.320 Havemeyer illness reported in NY
89.110 Havemeyer
90.300 Havemeyer death reported. Secrecy
90.560 reversal—date 1
90.120
89.190
87.880 Secrecy policy reversal—date 2
87.850
87.850
86.940
87.760
86.730
86.610
87.230
87.390
88.780 W.B. Thomas announced as
Havermeyer successor
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Appendix A (continued)

Date
12/21
12/23
12/24
12/26
12/27
12/28
12/30
12/31
1/2/08
1/3
1/4
1/6
1/7
1/8
1/9
1/10
1/11
1/13
1/14
1/15
1/16
1/17
1/18
1/20
1/21
1/22
1/23
1/24
1/25
1/27
1/28
1/29
1/30
1/31

American
Sugar
100.125
99.125
98.750
96.875
100.250
99.250
100.875
99.500
101.375
107.000
106.250
106.500
104.750
107.000
108.250
108.250
110.250
112.250
113.375
113.250
112.125
113.625
113.625
113.250
111.000
112.375
111.875
111.500
113.500
113.500
114.500
112.500
113.500
114.250
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Dow Jones
Railroad
index

Notes

89.350
88.110
87.610
87.010
88.410
88.350
89.500
88.770
89.810
90.380
90.370
91.120
91.150 Secrecy policy reversal—date 3
90.820 Annual Meeting. Secrecy policy
92.860 —date 4
92.030
93.750
94.270
95.060
95.100
94.680
95.270
95.750
94.670
93.090
92.760
92.460
91.660
92.220
92.730
93.400
92.400
92.440
92.190
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Appendix B
Pertinent Articles from the Wall Street Journal
1. "Features of the Market" extract - dates as noted:
Wed. 12/04/07

"American Sugar was naturally depressed on the serious
illness of H. O. Havemeyer. Washington has been selling
a little of the stock lately, which has often shown some
tendency to sell off about the time of the meeting of
Congress. American Sugar, however, has been very
much out of politics for a long time past."

Fri. 12/06/07

"The first transaction in American Sugar was one point
below the closing sale of the previous day on President
Havemeyer's death. It is admitted that the loss to the
company is a very serious one, as he raised it from the
most sensational gambling counter in the unlisted
department to one of the best held and distributed
industrial stocks in the market."

Wed. 12/11/07

". . . Sugar also was subjected to considerable pressure.
There was a poor market in it..."

Thurs. 12/12/07

"Inquiryfrompeople in close touch with the Havemeyer
family and the American Sugar situation disposes of any
rumors of a change in the holding of the stock arising out
of the death of the president. The selling, however comes
through conservative commission houses, and in the
opinion of specialists does not indicate a short position of
any consequence. It is naturally based upon the very
tangible loss the company has sustained in H. O.
Havemeyer's death, and represents investment holdings."

Fri. 12/13/07

"American Sugar opened active and higher. H. Content
who is thought to have sold something like 25,000 shares
on Wednesday, was reported active in making a market,
helped by J. Carlisle, the specialist in the stock. It used to
be one of the best trading industrials on the board, and
the present opportunity is considered favorable for
reviving interest."
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"Halsted & Hodges, who were among the heavy sellers of
stocks in the early trading of Wednesday, sold American
Sugar and Amalgamated Copper in considerable quantity
on the opening strength. Traders called this good
selling, and took it to be long stock."
Sat. 12/14/07

"American Sugar showed the severest break in the
industrial list, losing over 4 points. . ."

Mon. 12/16/07

"Houses which used to do a good deal of business for
lower Wall Street when American Sugar was the most
active industrial on the list, have been selling that stock.
Some of this is probably for shorts."
"There was renewed pressure in American Sugar at the
outset, with selling by J. Carlisle, the specialist in the
stock, CD. Barney & Co., and other influential
commission houses. Boston has been selling the stock
since H.O. Havemeyer's death. This is a natural result,
as investors there had great faith in the late president.
One disturbing factor, however, in the market has been
some selling from Washington in the past few days."

Wed. 12/18/07

Trade interests seem to be the principal bears in American
Sugar. One view is that the short crop will hurt earnings.
The fact possibly that trade enemies of the company see a
chance of retaliation for the Havemeyer attitude towards
them in past years."

Fri. 12/20/07

"American Sugar, after opening quiet, advanced a point
and a half in the first ten minutes. Traders began to suspect
from the beginning of the week that short selling was being
encouraged, and a sharp demand for the stock in the loan
crowd on Wednesday confirmed this view.
The
Washington houses have been borrowers of the stock."

Mon. 12/23/07

"There was some disposition to test the strength of
American Sugar, but J. Carlisle, the specialist in the stock,
had buying orders, and seemed able to support it without
much difficulty. It is well and widely held, and soon
becomes oversold."
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Tues. 12/24/07

"Traders think that a little of the American Sugar bought to
support in the recent decline has been coming out quietly.
Lower Wall Street advices are bearish, but such speculators
do not seem to have made much by their preliminary
campaign after H.O. Havemeyer's death."

Fri. 12/27/07

"With very little pressure Sugar disclosed a rather weak
technical position. There is no doubt that the rally to par
forced in most of the shorts. The bear talk still comes from
lower Wall Street, and it looked as if a little long stock were
coming to the market, to judge by its more frequent
appearance in loans."
"The selling of Sugar in the forenoon was taken as
indicating that the New Street bear party was trying to
make an active market. S.L. Blood & Co. and E. F. Hutton
& Co. were conspicuous among the sellers, while the
specialists supported."

Sat. 12/28/07

"Bear points on American Sugar were again current. They
have reference to the election of the new president on Jan.
8, when lower Wall Street believes some permanent
difference among leading holders as to policy may make
itself felt."

Sat. 1/04/08

"One reason for the exceptional strength in Sugar is the real
scarcity of the stock. It loaned at 1.64 premium in the first
hour, and has been in demand flat in the loan crowd for
some time past. It was always a dangerous short sale, and
was oversold when H.O. Havemeyer died."

Wed. 1/08/08

"American Sugar was 2 points lower at the opening on the
violent attack by Claus A. Spreckles published in a morning
paper. While the Street does not regard him as altogether
impartial witness, traders admit that the attack is the most
formidable made upon the stock in many years."

Thurs. 1/09/08

" . . . Speculators who attacked American Sugar on the
protests of Mr. Spreckles found a market which was too
much for them, and probably took losses during the course
of the day..."
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2. Additional Articles - dates and titles as noted:
Tues. 12/03/07

"Answers to Inquires"
An investing advice column states: " . . . [American] Sugar
stock is in danger of being adversely affected by an
industrial slow-up, and also by agitation of the tariff
question."

Thurs. 12/05/07 "H. O. Havemeyer"
Announcement of the death of H. O. Havemeyer: " . . .
Under his control the American Sugar Refinery Co. has
. made a remarkable record of profitable operation. Mr.
Havemeyer's methods imparted steadiness and efficiency to
his corporation, but his policy was not that of publicity, so
that he belonged to a passing rather than to a new era of
corporate finance."
"H. O. Havemeyer Dead"
Provides a brief biographical sketch of H. O. Havemeyer.
Fri. 12/06/0

"American Sugar Refining Co."
Article downplays the impact of H. O. Havemeyer's
death:"While the removal of death of Henry O. Havemeyer,
founder and president of the American Sugar Refining Co.,
for between sixteen and seventeen years, is a loss which is
bound to be severely felt, the splendid organization which
had been perfected under his leadership, in the opinion of
those most familiar with its affairs, has gathered sufficient
momentum to carry forward the business without
interruption or diminution of prosperity.. ."

Tues. 12/10/07

"American Sugar Refining Co.: Havemeyer's Death
Likely to Result in Abandonment of Secrecy Policy"
Article predicts more open communication with
stockholders.

Wed. 12/11/07

"Dividends and Meetings"
"The directors of the American Sugar Refining Co. have
elected Horace Havemeyer, a director of the company to
succeed his father, H. O. Havemeyer, deceased. VicePresident Thomas was appointed acting President until the
next annual meeting, Jan 8.

Published by eGrove, 1997

21

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 2
22

The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997

Appropriate resolutions were passed by the board regarding
the death of Mr. Havemeyer."
Mon. 12/16/07

"American Sugar Refining: Trade and Company
Conditions Good"
"Secretary Heike, of the American Sugar Refining Co.,
says: "The condition of the sugar trade and of the company
is very good. We are doing a normal business for this
season of the year, and the general business recession has
not as yet affected the sugar market. The sugar crop is a
little short this year.'
In the sugar trade it is stated that there is no apparent cause
for the selling of sugar stock. The American Sugar
refineries are all running. Its sugar accumulations are
sufficient for thirty days, and of these, 50,000 tons were
bought by Mr. Havemeyer shortly before his death, at the
lowest prices current for sugar for the year and as l/4c.
below present values, which transaction netted a profit of
$200,000.
The company's purchases of sugar in October and
November show their cost was below present value. The
total stocks of all refiners is only 100,000 tons.
Mr. Thomas, the acting president, has been in the
management for many years and has wide knowledge of the
sugar trade.
It is said the financial results for the present fiscal year are
the best that the company has yet experienced. The profits
from the Beet Sugar industry along are said to have
increased fully 25%."

Tues. 12/17/07

"American Sugar Refining Co. Again Center of
Interest"
"Not for years has the American Sugar Refining stock been
so active as during the past week when over 107,000 shares
changed hands at prices ranging from 106 1/2 to 92 3/4, the
latter being the lowest point recorded in years.
Considerable interest has been aroused as to the causes of
this activity, and all the more so, since the company's
officials maintain the trade is normal for this time of year,
and that conditions, generally, are favorable. Injustice to
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the 17,000 stockholders it should be pointed out that in the
sugar trade there is utmost confidence as to the future. The
crop is a little short of last year's crop, but on the other
hand much better prices prevail.
For the fiscal year, about to close, it is believed, and there
is sufficient ground for so doing, that the earnings will be
larger that in any year heretofore. .. .
. . . One reason advanced for the marked decline in the
stock is the loss of H. O. Havemeyer, which, if be true, is
indeed a tribute to his ability as the real genius of the
American Sugar Refining Co. The company was
apparently too well organized for such to have a radical
effect, though it undoubtably did occasion considerable
selling."
Wed. 12/18/07

"American Sugar"
"Many thousand shares of American Sugar common have
been picked up by individual investors on the decline to 92
3/4, and in the cause of several Boston houses, Sugar
buying last week was the investment feature..."

Fri. 12/20/07

"American Sugar"
"... The notice states that proxies will be voted for the reelection of Messrs. Parsons and Frazier and the election of
Horace Havemeyer to succeed his father. It is the intention
of the board, as Mr. Heike [Secretary], at the annual
election of the officers after the stockholders meeting, to
elect W. B. Thomas as president of the company."

Tues. 1/07/08

"American Sugar Refining Co. Completes a Successful
Year"
"The American Sugar Refining Co.'s past fiscal year,
which will be reviewed at the annual meeting on
Wednesday, Jan 8., was one of the best that the company
has experienced. . .
With the inauguration of the new management it is
supposed that the policy of the company will change, the
keynote of the new administration being less antagonistic
and less secret. It is presumed that the various lawsuits
inherited from the Havemeyer regime will be adjudicated.
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. . . The strength of the stock in the past week, during
which it showed a net gain of seven points, is attributable
to various causes. Primarily, the crop is smaller than last
year's. This in itself, is sufficient cause for the higher
prices prevailing... Another bull point as far as the stock
is concerned is the spread of the labor troubles in Cuba.
Still another factor pointed to with considerable satisfaction
by the sugar traders is the attitude of Secretary Taft taken
in regard to the duty on sugar and the regulation of the
supply from the Philippines. . ."
Wed. 1/08/08

"American Sugar"
"The officers of the American Sugar Refining Co. brand the
Spreckel's charges against the Sugar Co. as utterly absurd.
Acting President Thomas says, 'The story is, of course,
untrue,' and Secretary Heike is equally emphatic in denying
the truth of the account.
Friends of the American Sugar Refining Co. in the sugar
trade admit that more publicity in regard to the company's
affairs would be better policy. The new management has
already committed itself to more open and less antagonistic
methods. President Thomas has given his word to this
effect. It will however, take some time to bring about this
result completely but the first step in this direction is
expected at the annual meeting tomorrow, when President
Thomas may in his review of the year disclose more
information that has been given out heretofore."
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